Evolution of the Military Kill Chain: From Find, Fix, Finish to Find, Disrupt, Fix, Finish, Follow-through
Origins and Effectiveness of the F3EAD Model in Counterinsurgency
Special Operations Forces and Network Targeting Cycles
For two decades, the phrase “Find, Fix, Finish” has been a cornerstone of U.S. military operations. Born from the intelligence and special operations community and sharpened in the counterinsurgency (COIN) fights of Iraq and Afghanistan, it evolved into the F3EAD model: Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate. Under this system, special operations forces (SOF) pioneered a relentless, intelligence-driven cycle of network targeting. As Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) famously demonstrated in Iraq, each raid was not just an endpoint — it was a launchpad. Raids were designed not only to capture or kill high-value individuals but to exploit the site, analyze the gathered intelligence, and disseminate new targeting data, thereby fueling subsequent missions in a rapid, self-sustaining loop.
Limitations of F3EAD in Large-Scale Combat Operations
The F3EAD framework worked exceptionally well in COIN environments, where U.S. forces enjoyed overwhelming technological dominance, air superiority, and near-total control over the intelligence picture. It allowed small teams to repeatedly dismantle insurgent networks with precision and speed. But as the U.S. military pivots toward large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against peer or near-peer adversaries, it must confront a stark reality: the same asymmetric advantages that enabled success in COIN are no longer guaranteed on the modern battlefield. Against sophisticated adversaries like Russia and China, the U.S. must now account for opponents who have their own kill chains, their own drones, their own electronic warfare capabilities, and their own ability to target, fix, and finish U.S. forces.
The Rise of Disruption: Adapting to Peer and Near-Peer Threats
Understanding Disruption in Modern Kill Chains
This realization has driven the evolution of the F3EAD framework into something more robust and adaptive: the Find, Disrupt, Fix, Finish, Follow-through model. While the core logic of F3 remains — locate the enemy, pin them in place, and destroy them — the addition of “Disrupt” and “Follow-through” reflects the lessons learned not only from COIN but also from the realities of fighting a peer enemy with comparable capabilities.
Disruption, in particular, has emerged as the lightfighter’s superpower. It is the ability not just to strike, but to spoil: to break the enemy’s kill chain, to force them into hesitation or error, to deny them tempo and cohesion. In LSCO, disruption is no longer the exclusive domain of electronic warfare teams or long-range artillery. It is a tactical survival tool that belongs at every level, from sniper teams harassing command posts, to recon units ambushing forward observers, to light infantry elements deceiving enemy ISR with decoys and false signatures.
Historically, the U.S. military has excelled at executing its own kill chains — the sequence of Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess, known in Air Force parlance as F2T2EA. But it has often underappreciated the importance of actively attacking the enemy’s kill chain. Peer adversaries like Russia and China have developed their own highly integrated targeting systems. Russia’s reconnaissance-strike complex, for example, combines UAVs, electronic intercepts, forward observers, and massed artillery to detect, target, and destroy enemy units at high speed. In Ukraine, Russian forces have employed swarms of commercial and military drones to identify Ukrainian positions, feeding that data directly to artillery batteries, often launching strikes within minutes of detection. For Ukrainian units, survival has depended less on superior firepower than on the ability to break the Russian kill chain — through mobility, dispersion, camouflage, electronic warfare, and the rapid targeting of Russian sensor and C2 nodes.
China’s approach, sometimes called “system destruction warfare,” targets not just enemy units but entire operational architectures. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aims to collapse an adversary’s system-of-systems by striking its reconnaissance, communications, logistics, and command networks. This doctrine is evident in China’s investment in anti-ship ballistic missiles, space-based sensors, cyber capabilities, and anti-satellite weapons, all designed to blind, disrupt, and paralyze U.S. and allied forces long before the first shots are fired.
Faced with these adversary capabilities, U.S. doctrine has adapted. Army tactical publications now reflect a five-phase sequence: Find, Disrupt, Fix, Finish, Follow-through. This is more than a doctrinal update; it represents a cultural shift. Disruption has become a deliberate phase, one that requires active measures to upset the enemy’s tempo, cohesion, and targeting ability. When U.S. forces find an enemy battalion, they are no longer expected to immediately fix and assault it. Instead, they might first disrupt its movement with precision fires, blind it with electronic attacks, jam its communications, or deceive its ISR systems. Only then, when the enemy is disoriented or forced into a premature course of action, is the fixing and finishing phase initiated.
The Role of Lightfighters in the Disruption Phase
For tactical and organizational leaders, this shift demands a reexamination of how units are trained, equipped, and employed. At the small-unit level, snipers become not just precision shooters, but highly mobile disruption assets. They can immobilize enemy convoys by targeting optics or vehicle commanders, force defensive positions into cover with harassing fire, or eliminate critical command personnel to create cascading delays. Reconnaissance units, traditionally the eyes and ears of the force, are now also hunters of enemy ISR. They must be trained to detect, track, and destroy enemy drones, intercept forward observers, or relay target data for indirect fires on high-payoff targets like radar systems and logistics hubs. Light infantry units, often the most vulnerable in LSCO, must master camouflage, dispersion, deception, and mobility — not simply to survive, but to actively spoil enemy targeting cycles.
Training programs must reflect these realities. Sniper courses should integrate target acquisition, rapid displacement, and multi-domain awareness. Reconnaissance units must train in counter-reconnaissance, electronic detection, and target handoff to fires networks. Light infantry battalions should routinely exercise under simulated drone and EW threats, practicing radio discipline, signature management, and rapid force dispersion. Perhaps most critically, leaders must rehearse degraded operations, cultivating the ability to operate with limited communications and empowering junior leaders with the trust and intent necessary to execute mission orders independently.
One of the clearest lessons from Ukraine is that breaking the enemy’s kill chain is as decisive as executing your own. Ukrainian forces have survived and even thrived not because they match Russia shell for shell, but because they have denied Russia’s ability to sense, target, and strike effectively. U.S. units must internalize this lesson. Tactical leaders should be trained to look beyond the immediate firefight, to ask: What can we do to disrupt the enemy’s targeting process? Battalion staff must weave disruption tasks into operations orders, assigning subordinate units the responsibility not only to defend or attack, but to degrade enemy C2 and ISR actively.
Training and Doctrine Changes for Modern Kill Chain Master
Equally important is the follow-through phase, often neglected in doctrinal discussions. Once an enemy force is defeated or routed, the ability to consolidate gains, exploit opportunities, and prevent regrouping can transform tactical success into operational advantage. This requires agile reserves, mission command flexibility, and a shared understanding of the commander’s intent at every level. Follow-through, in short, is how tactical wins become strategic leverage.
Importantly, disruption also carries an ethical imperative. As precision increases, so does responsibility. Lightfighters, snipers, and reconnaissance teams are uniquely positioned to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage by shaping fights early and decisively, before brute force becomes the only option. Ethical restraint and proportionality are not constraints on effectiveness; they are force multipliers that preserve legitimacy, enable freedom of action, and reduce the likelihood of protracted conflict.
Why Disruption Defines Victory in LSCO
This white paper leaves leaders with a clear call to action at the tactical and organizational levels: disruption is no longer an optional skill or a staff-level concern. It is a survival imperative. It is the domain of the sniper firing the right shot, the recon team blinding the enemy’s drones, the infantry platoon laying a decoy to draw enemy fires away from civilians, and the company commander weaving deception into the attack plan. Disruption must be trained, practiced, and culturally embedded, not as a last-minute add-on, but as a reflexive part of how leaders and soldiers think about war.
The evolution from Find, Fix, Finish to Find, Disrupt, Fix, Finish, Follow-through is more than an update to doctrine; it is an adaptive response to the realities of modern warfare. As lightfighters face adversaries with equal or near-equal technological capabilities, the ability to break the enemy’s system — to sow confusion, deny tempo, and create opportunities — will be the decisive edge. Leaders at every level must recognize that the battle is no longer just about executing a kill chain; it’s about disrupting the enemy’s kill chain faster and more effectively than they can disrupt yours. Victory in LSCO will go not to the side with the most firepower, but to the side that best masters the art of disruption.
